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**Authoritarian Attitudes in Russia: Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation in the Modern Russian Context**

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### **Data Availability Statement**

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.

### **Abstract**

The study of authoritarianism has a long history in the field of psychology; however, much of this research focuses on Western countries, especially the United States. In effort to better understand authoritarianism cross-culturally, we explore the current state of authoritarianism in an important cultural context: Russia. Thus, the current paper explores large-scale research of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in the modern Russian context. Six studies (total  $N = 1358$ ) included personality traits, basic human values, social beliefs, and intergroup attitudes that allowed us to comprehensively consider authoritarian attitudes in Russia. The results showed that personological profile and pattern of reaction to threat among Russian authoritarians is similar to Western authoritarians. However, economic views inherited from Soviet ideology make Russians differ in their view on economic conservatism supported by Western authoritarians. These data provide insight into the psychology of authoritarianism as well as explore novel aspects of Russian culture.

Keywords: authoritarian personality, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, personality traits, basic human values, social beliefs, intergroup attitudes.

### **Authoritarian Attitudes in Russia: Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation in the Modern Russian Context**

The study of authoritarianism has a long history in the field of psychology. Adorno et al. (1950) laid a solid foundation for the subsequent study of authoritarianism by introducing the concept of authoritarian personality into broad circulation. Modern research widely considers right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) as two related-yet-distinct aspects of authoritarianism (Cichocka & Dhont, 2018; Duckitt, 2020; Duckitt & Sibley, 2017; Hodson et al., 2017), which are considered to have an evolutionary

basis for sociofunctional adaptive purposes regarding coalitional competition in the ancestral environment (Grigoryev et al., 2020; Sinn, 2018; Sinn & Hayes, 2017, 2018). The history of the field attempts to highlight and clarify some universal psychological basis of authoritarianism, e.g., the need for social uniformity and intolerance of difference (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997) and a set of generalized attitudes regulating the relations between a group and an individual (social order vs. personal autonomy; Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005).

The concept of authoritarian attitudes has frequently been examined in Western countries, and authoritarian research has been especially fruitful in the United States. Nevertheless, surprisingly little research has examined authoritarianism outside of the United States, and there is a strong need for work beyond typical WEIRD samples (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic; Henrich et al., 2010). Thus, the examination of authoritarian attitudes beyond the United States is vital, and further progress on authoritarianism and related issues requires the use of a broader comparative context (e.g., Conway et al., 2021; Duriez et al., 2005; Jost et al., 2003). As a result, to more fully understand the nature of authoritarianism, in the present paper we explore the current state of authoritarianism in an important cultural context: Russia. Moreover, given that Russia's not-too-distant history contains a dominant left-wing political group, this evidence could add to the current debates about left-wing authoritarianism (LWA, e.g., Conway et al., 2020c, 2021; Costello et al., 2021). Indeed, some of the primary evidence for LWA has been found using authoritarianism scales during the left-wing communist Soviet Union government (McFarland et al., 1992, 1993, 1996; see Conway et al., 2021, for a review). Curiously, this evidence showed that left-wing communists in that era tended to score higher on *right*-wing authoritarianism measurements. This suggests that, unlike persons who score high on a pure LWA measurement in Western contexts (e.g., Conway et al., 2018; Costello et al., 2021; van Hiel et al., 2006), Russian authoritarians might be a mixture of left-wing and right-wing

elements (see Conway et al., 2021, for a discussion). Importantly, not only does the present research examine these factors in modern contexts, it also allows for a more nuanced understanding of this mixture of left-wing politics and right-wing authoritarianism by more fully examining the constellation of variables surrounding modern Russian authoritarianism. Thus, understanding the current state of authoritarianism using RWA by unpacking traits and values of politically neutral, conservative, and liberal Russians will advance our understanding of the relationship between left-wing ideology/policies with LWA.

Below, we first provide an overview of authoritarianism. Then we review what we know about authoritarianism in Russia and set the stage for our research project. We then proceed to examine our six studies in the modern Russian context.

### **The Concept of Authoritarianism**

The conceptualization and measurement of authoritarianism are not simple (Duckitt, 2020). Altemeyer's approach to authoritarianism (1981), which includes three facets (authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism), dominated the literature for a long time, and his RWA measure is still the most widely-used authoritarianism scale today (see Conway et al., 2018; Conway et al., 2021). Later research suggested that Social Dominance Orientation – the belief that group inequality is justified – could also be considered a vital part of the larger authoritarianism umbrella (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994).

The Dual Process Model suggested an integrative framework, which claims differentiation between RWA and SDO — RWA reflects the “submission” dimension of authoritarianism and SDO reflects the “dominance” dimension of authoritarianism (Sibley & Duckitt, 2013). This model suggests that RWA involves expressing (or maintaining) motivational goals of collective (or ingroup) security and cohesion whereas SDO involves expressing (or maintaining) motivational goals of group dominance and superiority over

others (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017) and might also reflect the sociofunctional motive for power-based exploitation (Sinn & Hayes, 2018).

Building on this work, some additional research indicates advantages to a multidimensional approach for understanding the structure of both RWA and SDO. Evidence has repeatedly shown support for a tripartite approach to RWA: aggression/authoritarianism, submission/conservatism, and conventionalism/traditionalism (e.g., Dunwoody & Funke, 2016; Duckitt et al., 2010; Funke, 2005; Mavor et al., 2010) and for two dimensions of SDO: dominance and (anti-)egalitarianism (e.g., Ho et al., 2012; 2015).<sup>1</sup> The relationship between RWA and SDO stems from the correlation between their specific components: aggression/authoritarianism and dominance (Kandler et al., 2016).

In addition, these aspects of authoritarianism are united by the presence of specific covariates. Many possible covariates of authoritarianism can be broadly divided into dispositional (i.e., genetics, personality, motives, values, and cognitive factors), situational or social influences (i.e., family and parental influences, personal and social experiences, and broader societal and cultural factors), and threat, which is largely situational but also reflects dispositional differences in threat perception. Assumed outcomes of authoritarianism are also broad, including prejudice, intolerance, nationalism, militarism, anti-democratic attitudes, and support for autocratic leadership (Duckitt, 2020).

Consideration of such sets of core variables in the Russian context could facilitate further progress in the conceptualization of authoritarianism in literature. It is to that context that we turn next.

### **Understanding Authoritarianism in the Modern Russia**

Russia has a complex history of attitudes toward authority, hierarchy, and social change. Several events can be listed as key contributors to these sentiments: (1) Serfdom in Russia was abolished only in 1861; (2) Orthodox Christianity had a huge impact on Russian

culture, the Orthodox Church has been a pillar of monarchical rule and ideological legitimization of the vertical power hierarchy for a long time; (3) the Russian Revolution in 1917 marked the beginning of Soviet power before 1991, which was based on the Marxist communist ideology with egalitarianism beliefs. After that, Russia has gone from democracy and market reforms to today's autocratic regime with a conservative twist to a complicated mixture of Soviet and Russian Orthodox values. These highly modifying events shaped the unique content of social, economic, and political views people in Russia have. Early McFarland et al. (1992, 1996) studies in the former Soviet Union have shown some influence of the Soviet legacy on authoritarianism; RWA was tied to conventionalism rather than to the specific conservative ideologies found in the West, but little is known about the state of affairs in modern Russia. In addition, the Russian specifics of SDO were not considered at all.

What might we expect in modern Russia? As a starting point, it is useful to compare what we already know about Russia with what we know about the United States, the context where authoritarian attitudes are most studied. For example, the World Value Survey shows that Russia and the United States are in opposite quadrants of traditional vs. secular-rational and survival vs. self-expression value dimensions. Moreover, Russia has shown a reverse pattern of the typical global trends, and has moved more towards the values of survival and still continues moving toward more traditional values (Inglehart, 2018). In addition, Russia and the United States differ by two or more orders in terms of all of the six Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede et al., 2010).<sup>2</sup> For example, in collectivism (i.e., a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society) and in power distance (i.e., an acceptance of hierarchical order in society).

Research in other areas of the world further suggest that some of the features of authoritarianism, which are characteristic of both Eastern Europe and Russia, also might

differ across countries. Based in assumptions that a strong RWA-SDO relation only occurs in cultures in which the left-right distinction is prominent, RWA and SDO were positively correlated in Belgium but not in Poland, and political involvement rather than socialization is important to explain these intracultural differences. It was concluded that East European authoritarians prefer left-wing economic principles, which go hand in hand with the desire to preserve one's culture, but they do not seem to be interested in the true aims of left-wing economic principles (i.e., creating equality). And they likely support these principles only because they are part of their cultural tradition (Duriez et al., 2005).

However, the endorsement of totalitarian socialist ideology in Croatia, which combined political totalitarianism, state economic interventionism, and egalitarianism and working-class ruling, was predicted by authoritarianism ('dominance-submissive syndrome', which combined authoritarian, aggression, authoritarian submission, and SDO) and national threat perception (national siege mentality, perception of threat from European Union, and support for immigrant persecution; Šram & Dulić, 2015). This measure of totalitarian socialist ideology is perhaps closest to Soviet ideology, which has been characteristic of the Russian context.

Western Europeans and Central and Eastern Europeans differ in the relationships between conservation values and the left-right spectrum (the positive relationships among the right for the first, negative – for the second). Moreover, conservation values positively predicted social antiegalitarianism in both regions, whereas economic egalitarianism – only among Central and Eastern Europeans. In turn, economic egalitarianism was higher among the left in both regions, while social egalitarianism – among the left in Western Europe only (Hadarics, 2017). The European Values Study showed that the population in Russia placed itself on average more on the left and had a more positive view of the communist system of

governing compared to the population in other Eastern European countries (de Regt et al., 2011).

Regarding the most current situation, paternalist populism in Eastern Europe, which combined the delegitimization of civil society and the return to the belief in a strong state, self-confidence and resentment against the West, victim mentality and the adaptation of conspiracy theories, the resurrection of the Christian political identity, and the transformation of populist discourse into a language and organizational strategy (see Enyedi, 2020), is characteristic of modern Russia as well. Thus, although in some ways we can expect common patterns for Russia and Eastern Europe, unique relationships in the modern Russian context are also possible.

### **Overview of the Present Research**

In this research, we investigated the relationships between two different aspects of authoritarianism (RWA and SDO), personality traits, basic human values, social beliefs, and intergroup attitudes. The research included six separate studies to comprehensively consider authoritarian attitudes in Russia. Costello et al. (2021) have claimed that the “heart” of authoritarianism includes a preference for social uniformity, prejudice toward different others, cognitive rigidity and moral absolutism, willingness to wield group authority to coerce behavior, aggression and punitiveness toward perceived enemies, and outsized concern for hierarchy. This list suggests both personological and ideological features which can be explored. Studies 1 and 2 address authoritarianism in Russia as really associated with less open personality and more rigid cognitive traits, as well as social and conservative motivational goals. While subsequent studies address sensitivity to threat and conspiracy, endorsement for traditional Russian conservative views, maintaining the status quo, prejudiced intercultural relations.

### **Common Procedure and Data Analytics Strategy**

**Procedure.** The data were collected online via social media in 2018. All participants filled in the questionnaire voluntarily and did not receive any remuneration. We recruited participants using targeted, paid ads in “VK”, the most popular social network in Russia. This social network consisted of more than 90 million Russian citizens and provided good access to the major parts of the Russian population. Further, some previous studies successfully used this platform in psychological research (e.g., Grigoryev et al., 2018a, 2020). Participants were given a questionnaire and asked to read the instructions, which included information about the main topics discussed in the study, confidentiality policy, and how to contact the researchers. This procedure was in line with Russian regulations; as per university and national Russian regulations, no ethics clearance was required for this type of survey research (if it did not include medical data). The sociodemographic information by participants for all the studies is available in Table 1.

**Questionnaire.** All measures in the questionnaire were administered in Russian. The measures which did not have a Russian translation were adapted by back-translation and cognitive interviews with the think-aloud technique (Willis, 2004), followed by statistical analyses to ensure their internal consistency and factor structure. These measures reflected a battery of variables in aspects of personality traits, basic human values, social beliefs, and intergroup attitudes theorized lying within an authoritarian nomological network. Early works showed differential patterns with particular personality traits, values, motives, beliefs, and worldviews associated with RWA (low openness, high conscientiousness, conservation values, binding moral foundations, dangerous worldview) and with SDO (low agreeableness, self-enhancement values, individualizing moral foundations, competitive worldview; Duckitt, 2020). All used measures were described in detail in the Supplementary Material. Also, each questionnaire contained sociodemographic questions (gender, age, education, religious affiliation, etc.).

**Power analysis.** We conducted a power analysis to determine the projected sample sizes. The effect size in this study was  $r = .20$ , which can be considered to be close to the average effect size in social psychology (see e.g., Richard et al., 2003). The projected sample size needed with this effect size in line with GPower 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) with an alpha = .05 and power = .80 was approximately  $N = 191$  per study.

**Preliminary analysis.** Data screening included checking for outliers and missing data. The outliers, which were excluded from the analyses, were detected by the Mahalanobis distance, Cook's distance, and leverage value (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2018). We used bivariate correlations to estimate relationships between the variables.

**Networks analysis.** Given all these potential variables, understanding their mutual relations may clarify the overall picture. Thus, we investigated the network structure of authoritarian attitudes of Russia to better understand common patterns within a cognitive network and establish what is central to authoritarian attitudes' systems. Network analysis should reveal the amount and closeness of authoritarian attitudes' associations and also determine which elements are binding (connecting) and confounding (redundant) for other variables. For example, an element with the most direct associations in the network can be considered central. Overall, this analysis should show whether the nodes are isolated or the network contains strong clusters of variables (communities) and the global structure in whole is sparse or dense. The topology, or overall global structural organization, of the authoritarian attitudes and the roles of specific variables in the networks, can emerge in a manner that other statistical approaches cannot provide. Especially useful in this approach for identifying core components of a political belief system is examining the position of components within the structure of the entire belief system (see Brandt et al., 2019). Moreover, there is an important advantage of network analysis over regression analysis, which is used in most cases in the literature on RWA and SDO. Any results of regression analysis are extremely sensitive to

which combination of predictors is given. Whether a predictor is important or not depends on what other predictors have been added to it.

We applied the networks analysis using the R package *qgraph* and EBICglasso procedure (Epskamp et al., 2012). Networks include graphical representations of the associations (edges) between variables (nodes). Using different edges thickness and colors, the networks show the regularized partial correlation between each pair of variables after accounting for the shared variance in the network. In each layout in which the length of edges depends on the absolute weight of the edges, the stronger connected nodes are placed closer to each other. Since not all nodes in a network are equally important in determining the network's structure, we used three centrality measures: strength, closeness, and betweenness. A node is central (or important/influential) if (1) it has many strong direct connections (strength); (2) it is close (indirect connections) to all other nodes (closeness); and (3) it connects other nodes (betweenness; Epskamp et al., 2012). To estimate the number of dimensions (clusters) of a given dataset, we used graphical lasso and a random walk algorithm. The glasso regularization parameter is set via EBIC.

### **Study 1: Personality Traits**

Previous meta-analytic evidence on the Big 5 personality inventory showed that RWA was associated with low Openness to Experience and high Conscientiousness, whereas SDO was associated with low Agreeableness and also weakly associated with low Openness to Experience (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). In addition, the meta-analytic evidence on the Dark Triad showed that SDO was strongly associated with all Dark Triad components, and RWA was weakly associated with low Psychopathy (Vize et al., 2018). Previous research suggests that high need for closure is primarily associated with RWA, not SDO (e.g., Corr et al., 2013; van Hiel et al., 2004), and similarly, religiosity is associated with RWA, not SDO (e.g., Dallago et al., 2008; Lockhart et al., 2020).

Considering this strong meta-analytic evidence and support in different contexts, we expect the same patterns in Russia. That is, the very approach to authoritarianism presupposes that there are defining features of authoritarianism (i.e., willingness to follow authorities, and orders from above as well as a keenness to exert authoritarian power over lower social groups and outsiders) and some specific common personality traits (e.g., rigidity, dogmatism) that should be reflected in authoritarianists.

## **Results**

### **Preliminary Analysis**

The data had no outliers or missing values. The correlations between variables can be found in Table 2. All of the subscales of RWA and SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) were positively correlated with the level of religiosity. Also, all of the subscales of RWA were positively correlated with the need for closure except for RWA:ASC-Submission. There were differences in correlations for RWA:Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism (RWA:ACT) and RWA:Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism (RWA:ASC) and personality traits, and mainly, RWA:ACT-Traditionalism had correlations with them. SDO was correlated with low agreeableness and high psychopathy and machiavellianism.

### **Network Analysis**

The network appears in Figure 1 (centrality measures plots are available in the Supplementary Material). Traditionalism and psychopathy were central nodes in the network. The network contained five communities corresponding (1) SDO nodes, (2) components of RWA and level of religiosity nodes, (3) need for closure and imagination nodes, (4) dark triad nodes and extraversion and agreeableness nodes, and (5) conscientiousness and neuroticism nodes.

## **Discussion**

The results expectedly showed that the cognitive basis for RWA was need for closure, which was primarily associated with low imagination, one facet of openness to experience. RWA had a strong constellation of the component and level of religiosity. Psychopathy, characterized primarily by low agreeableness and high machiavellianism, was the main psychological trait with an ambivalence role for authoritarian attitudes. On one hand, psychopathy was negatively associated with traditionalism, on other hand, positively associated with antiegalitarianism.

On the whole, this corresponds to the previously obtained results. However, unlike prior research, Study 1 offers more detailed insight into these relationships due to our network analyses (previous meta-analyses considered zero-order relations only). For example, need for closure and imagination placed into one cluster in the network. Our analysis suggests that Russian authoritarians and authoritarians from Western countries show a common personality syndrome primarily included the high conscientiousness and need for closure as well as low imagination, i.e., act dutifully and anti-intraception in terms of the original concept of the authoritarian personality by Adorno et al. (1950).

### **Study 2: Basic Human Values**

Study 2 built on Study 1 by evaluating the relationship of RWA and SDO with basic human values. This is an important supplement for personological features of authoritarianists to consider RWA and SDO as expressing specific motivational goals. In previous Western research, RWA was associated more strongly with conservation values as an expression of the motivational goals of social control and security than SDO, whereas RWA and SDO were associated equally with self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence values (Cohrs et al., 2005). RWA has the strongest positive correlations with Security, Conformity, and Tradition, and a weaker negative correlation with Universalism (Passini, 2017; see also Duriez et al., 2005).

In another study with the Refined Theory of Basic Values, the strongest positive correlations were between RWA and conservation values (especially Security-societal and Tradition) and RWA had negative correlations with self-transcendence values (especially Universalism-tolerance and Universalism-concern) and openness to change values (especially both Self-direction values). On the other hand, the strongest positive correlations for SDO were self-enhancement values, and comparable with RWA, there were negative correlations between SDO and self-transcendence values (especially Universalism-concern; Passini, 2020). These common motivational goals should be also characterized for authoritarianism in Russia.

## **Results**

### **Preliminary Analysis**

The data had no outliers or missing values. The correlations between variables can be found in Table 3. The correlations with the level of religiosity showed the same pattern as in Study 1. Universalism was negatively correlated with RWA and SDO except for RWA:ASC-Conventionalism. RWA was negatively correlated with openness to change and self-enhancement values (especially RWA:ACT-Traditionalism), and positively correlated with conservation values.

### **Network Analysis**

The network appears in Figure 2. Traditionalism and universalism were central nodes in the network. In general, the clusters were close to Schwartz's higher-order values (i.e., conservation vs. openness to change and self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement). The network contained four communities corresponding to (1) SDO nodes, (2) components of RWA and conservation and self-transcendence values nodes, (3) openness to change values nodes, and (4) self-enhancement values nodes.

## **Discussion**

These findings showed both similarities and differences with previous findings from other cultural locales. On the one hand, the relationships with universalism, which was mostly associated with low antiegalitarianism and low conservatism, supported the idea that the universalizing functional motive (i.e., breaking coalitions and hierarchies in the ingroup and dealing with the threat in an individualized manner, by developing a weaker link with the ingroup and a stronger identification with broader categories such as humankind, and also sacrifices for common good) is opposite to authoritarian and dominating functional motive yielding RWA and SDO, respectively (see Sinn, 2018).

On the other hand, unlike in other contexts, the Russian data did not show significant relationships between SDO and self-enhancement values. The relationships for self-enhancement values might mean that individual motivational goals of these values are not involved in group motivation, which is characterized for SDO. Moreover, the positive relationships between conformity and power are characterized by Schwartz's hierarchy value at the cultural level. At the cultural level, conformity is a facet of the hierarchy value and is close to the social power, wealth, and authority values. Because, as a cultural rule, encouraging people to show conformity supports the use of hierarchical roles to regulate human interdependence. In turn, effective hierarchies require that people have power over those below them in a hierarchy, but also show conformity toward those above them in a hierarchy (Schwartz, 2011). In addition, this indicates that authoritarianism in Russian deals with motivational goals of social focus (i.e., conservation and self-transcendence), not personal (openness to change and self-enhancement).

### **Study 3: Social Beliefs**

Study 3 extended Studies 1 and 2 to evaluate additional factors that are universally important: Those dealing with social beliefs. According to the Dual Process Model, a dangerous worldview and a competitive worldview are the main predictors of RWA and

SDO, respectively. Further, a meta-analysis demonstrated positive correlations between all these variables (see Perry et al., 2013). Also, both RWA and SDO were positively associated with global belief in just world (e.g., De keersmaecker & Roets, 2020).

We found only one study where considered zero-sum game belief, RWA and SDO; this study on the large sample ( $N = 1000$ ) from South Korea reported that RWA was positively associated with zero-sum game belief, whereas SDO and zero-sum game belief had only a trivial (.07) significant association (Kwon & Park, 2019). RWA and SDO were positively associated with paranormal beliefs and belief in conspiracy theory (e.g., Dyrendal et al., 2021).

We did not find previous studies that reported the relationships between (anti-)utopianism and escapism with RWA and SDO. However, system justification was negatively associated with utopianism, positively associated with anti-utopianism, and not associated with escapism (Fernando et al., 2018). All these relationships can be expected for Russia as well because these social belief variables describe abstract generalized situations, which may have only a slight degree of cultural specificity.

## **Results**

### **Preliminary Analysis**

The data had no outliers or missing values. The correlations between variables can be found in Table 4. Consistent with work in other contexts, dangerous worldview was positively correlated with RWA (except RWA:ASC-Submission), whereas competitive worldview was positively correlated with SDO (especially SDO-D). Global Belief in a Just World was positively correlated with SDO and RWA:ACT-Conservatism/RWA:ASC-Submission. Zero-Sum Game Belief was only positively correlated with RWA:ACT-Authoritarianism and negatively correlated with RWA:ASC-Submission. Paranormal beliefs were positively correlated with RWA. Many correlations between generic conspiracist beliefs

and RWA were positive. However, government malfeasance was negatively correlated with RWA (especially RWA:ACT-Conservatism/RWA:ASC-Submission), control of information only had a low positive correlation with RWA:ACT-Traditionalism, while RWA:ASC-Submission had no correlations with the majority of conspiracist beliefs at all. Utopianism and escapism were negatively correlated with ASC-Conventionalism and ACT-Traditionalism. Anti-utopianism was positively correlated with SDO and all the subscales of RWA:ASC and RWA:ACT-Authoritarianism, but negatively correlated with RWA:ACT-Conservatism.

### **Network Analysis**

The network appears in Figure 3. Government malfeasance conservatism were central nodes in the network. The network contained four communities corresponding (1) SDO nodes, (2) components of RWA, government malfeasance, and social worldviews (dangerous worldview, competitive worldview, global belief in a just world, zero-sum game belief) nodes, (3) paranormal beliefs and all others generic conspiracist beliefs nodes, and (4) utopian thinking (utopianism, anti-utopianism, and escapism) nodes.

### **Discussion**

The results showed the expected patterns with some additional detail due to the used network approach: the path from global belief in just a world to utopian thinking in modern Russia. It seems that an unjust world was seen as a more dangerous and more competitive place, which suggests need for strict hierarchy and dominance; it is possible that dreams about an ideal society and egalitarianism in this world would be useless. In this context, then, RWA could be considered as an adaptive response to these threatening conditions.

Moreover, perhaps, trust in the government was another important factor, on one hand, conspiracy belief in government malfeasance was associated with a high competitive worldview and on other hand – low conservatism. These obtained relationships in Russia,

which correspond to previous findings, can demonstrate that RWA and SDO suggest universal copings of authoritarians for specific beliefs about the social world.

#### **Study 4: Conservatism**

Are authoritarians in Russia more conservative? Previous research in other locales shows that RWA was strongly correlated with social and cultural conservatism, SDO was strongly correlated with economic conservatism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). Further, RWA was strongly and positively associated with sanctity, authority, and loyalty moral foundations, whereas SDO was negatively associated with fairness and care, and weakly positively associated with other moral foundations (e.g., Milojev et al., 2014). Benevolent sexism stems from RWA, whereas hostile sexism stems from SDO (Sibley et al., 2007). RWA is related to collectivism (conformity) vs. individualism (autonomy; Ekehammar et al., 2004). Material values were positively associated with SDO, while the relationship with RWA was dependent on context (e.g., Díaz Lázaro et al., 2014; Roets et al., 2006).

How will this research translate to modern Russia? We expected that to be mixed. For example, we expected the same patterns as in prior research for sexism, collectivism, and moral foundations. That is especially so considering the results of Study 2, which demonstrated the relationships of RWA and SDO to conservatism and universalism values that are close in their semantic import to sexism and other such beliefs. Further, it is reasonable to expect that material values are also positively associated with SDO. However, we expect such values to be negatively associated with RWA because Russian Orthodox conservatism demands to choose in favor of spiritual values and an eternal afterlife instead of material goods. Further, the findings by McFarland et al. (1996) could suggest an expectation that RWA should be positively associated with social and cultural conservatism, but actually be negatively correlated with economic conservatism. Thus, there are reasons to expect that

the Russian context will show differential associations between different markers of conservatism and RWA/SDO.

## Results

### Preliminary Analysis

The data had no outliers or missing values. The correlations between variables can be found in Table 5 and Table 6. Care was negatively correlated with SDO and positively correlated with ASC-Conventionalism and ACT-Traditionalism. Fairness was negatively correlated with SDO and RWA:ACT-Conservatism/RWA:ASC-Submission. Loyalty and authority was positively correlated with RWA, whereas sanctity was positively correlated with RWA and negatively correlated with SDO. Benevolent sexism was positively correlated with RWA, while hostile sexism was positively correlated with RWA:ACT-Authoritarianism and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E). Personal community collectivism was positively correlated with RWA. Among material values, happiness was negatively correlated with RWA:ACT-Conservatism/RWA:ASC-Submission but success was positively correlated with SDO. RWA was positively correlated with all the domains of social conservatism with rare exceptions. Also, RWA was negatively correlated with capitalism and free market, emigration from the country, and immigration to the country. SDO had many fewer significant correlations, mostly positive correlations with capitalism and free market and negative correlations with welfare benefits and animal rights.

### Network Analysis

The networks appear in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Conservatism and fairness were central nodes in the first network. Principal components of RWA were central nodes in the second network. The first network contained three communities corresponding (1) SDO and fairness and care moral foundations nodes, (2) material values and hostile sexism nodes, and (3) components of RWA, benevolent sexism, personal community collectivism, and all others

moral foundations nodes. The second network contained five communities corresponding (1) SDO nodes, (2) two components of RWA (authoritarianism and conservatism) and authoritarian aggression (death penalty, strict laws, and military and national security) nodes, (3) traditionalism and tradition (e.g., religion, traditional values, large family, etc.) nodes, (4) emancipative values (abortions, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, childless family, sexuality education) nodes, and (5) capitalism (business, capitalism and free market, fiscal responsibility, welfare benefits, etc.) nodes.

### **Discussion**

As in the case of the universalism value, the fairness moral foundation was the key for authoritarian attitudes in modern Russia: authoritarian persons devalued fairness. The patterns of the relationships between RWA and SDO and moral foundations were also the same as in previous research in other national contexts. Interestingly, benevolent sexism was part of the RWA constellation, whereas hostile sexism was about material values. The domains of RWA were associated with the corresponded aspects of social conservatism.

However, as in prior work in Russia, the patterns for social and economic conservatism and RWA showed divergent patterns. Anticapitalism and RWA were still positively associated in modern Russia, which is the opposite of the pattern in the United States (McFarland et al., 1996). This suggests that, as was the case in prior research from over two decades ago, RWA in Russian is partially associated with left-wing political positions. The most essential aspect of the economic conservatism scale was welfare benefits, which were associated with egalitarianism what is typical for the left as in other countries.

### **Study 5: Intergroup Attitudes – Politics**

Following up on Study 4, we were further interested in additional political variables. In prior research, both RWA and SDO were positively associated with collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). Any consistent relationships between system justification,

nationalism, and patriotism and RWA and SDO were not found (e.g., Osborne et al., 2017; Salfate & Ayala, 2020; Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018). Threats to ingroup were associated with RWA, not SDO (Shaffer & Duckitt, 2013; see also Feldman & Stenner, 1997). SDO may be associated with realistic threat, whereas RWA may be associated with symbolic threat (e.g., Duckitt, 2006). RWA was associated with totalitarian socialist ideology (Šram & Dulić, 2015). RWA and SDO were positively associated with collective action intentions to support the government, not protesters (Saeri et al., 2015).

Some previous findings suggest that authoritarianism is related to maintaining of status quo in intergroup relations and prejudiced attitudes in Russia (Grigoryev et al., 2018b; 2020). Although Roets et al. (2015) reported that some contexts (e.g., Singapore) are unique examples that authoritarianism can be positively related to outgroup-friendly attitudes when a strong authority explicitly and relentlessly endorses multiculturalism and diversity. In addition, Russian state TV channels have a pronounced focus on anti-Western, patriotic, and nationalist sentiment and foreign threats. Thus, we expected these features among Russian authoritarians.

## **Results**

### **Preliminary Analysis**

The data had no outliers or missing values. The correlations between variables can be found in Table 7. Both RWA and SDO were positively correlated with patriotism, nationalism, collective narcissism, political totalitarianism, and general system justification. Activism intention was negatively correlated with SDO and RWA (except ASC-Conventionalism). Also, RWA was positively correlated with symbolic threat, national siege mentality, anti-western orientation, state economic interventionism, and watching TV. Egalitarianism and working-class ruling were negatively correlated with SDO and positively correlated with RWA:ACT-Traditionalism.

### **Network Analysis**

The network appears in Figure 6. General (or diffuse) system justification and conservatism were central nodes in the network. The network contained three communities corresponding (1) SDO nodes, (2) national proud (collective narcissism, patriotism, nationalism) and national threat perception (national siege mentality and anti-western orientation) nodes, and (3) components of RWA and all others nodes.

### **Discussion**

The results supported some discourse in the opposition Russian media that the state TV is a tool of propaganda, which focuses on the formation of an image of the West as threatening and antagonizing and patriotism as the basis of the ideology of maintaining the legitimacy of governance. Based on the network, it seems that this process involves system justification, conservatism, dominance orientation that reduce activism intention.

Also, the variables, which associated with the Soviet legacy, were closely related to the RWA constellation. Earlier studies in Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Yugoslavia, and Russia showed that authoritarianism was positively associated with support for socialist ideology, socialist party preferences, positive feelings for communists, political left self-placement, and communist principles (de Regt et al., 2011). This supports the idea that RWA is related to norms and beliefs, which are historically rooted in a specific society.

### **Study 6: Intergroup Attitudes – Ethnic**

Study 6 expands the view of intergroup attitudes of Study 5 on political attitudes by adding intercultural attitudes to our analysis. There are different kinds of ethnocentric bias: “intragroup ethnocentric bias” (favoring the ingroup over individual group members), which other studies have found correlated primarily with RWA and “intergroup ethnocentric bias” (with an emphasis on ingroup superiority over outgroups), which as previously found correlated primarily with SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017).

Symbolic threat and realistic threat from immigrants were associated with both RWA and SDO (e.g., Caricati et al., 2017). The relationships between RWA and SDO and colorblindness were mixed between studies even within the same country (e.g., Potrat & Spanierman, 2012; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). Ethnic identification was positively associated with RWA, not SDO (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2016). Antisemitism was positively associated with RWA, not SDO (Frindte et al., 2005), while Islamophobia was positively associated with both RWA and SDO (e.g., Imhoff & Recker, 2012; Tartaglia et al., 2019).

We expected a similar pattern for intragroup ethnocentrism as a response to threats, but a unique pattern for intergroup ethnocentrism, since Soviet internationalism emphasized the anti-exploitative orientation of intercultural relations what could have left a noticeable imprint on the current state. In addition, Soviet internationalism was colorblind with an orientation on the common Soviet identity and unification with “external national flavor” (as in Stalin’s concept “national in form, socialist in content”). Which contrasts with multicultural norms both in the West (see Guimond et al., 2013) and in the East (e.g. in Singapore; see Roets et al., 2015).

## **Results**

### **Preliminary Analysis**

The data had no outliers or missing values. The correlations between variables can be found in Table 8. Both ethnocentrism were positively correlated with RWA and SDO (except zero correlation between intergroup ethnocentrism and ASC-Submission). Colorblindness was negatively correlated with SDO and RWA (except RWA:ACT-Conservatism/RWA:ASC-Submission). Antisemitism was positively correlated with SDO and RWA (except RWA:ASC-Submission). Ethnic identification was positively correlated with RWA. Islamophobia was negatively correlated with RWA:ASC-Submission and positively correlated with SDO-D. Symbolic threat and ownership threat from

immigrants were positively correlated with SDO (except zero correlation between ownership threat and SDO-E), RWA:ACT-Authoritarianism/RWA:ASC-Aggression, and ASC-Conventionalism/ACT-Traditionalism. Realistic threat from immigrants was positively correlated with SDO-D and ASC-Conventionalism/ACT-Traditionalism.

### **Network Analysis**

The network appears in Figure 7. Intergroup ethnocentrism and intragroup ethnocentrism were central nodes in the network. The network contained three communities corresponding (1) SDO nodes, (2) components of RWA, intragroup ethnocentrism, and ethnic identification nodes, and (3) intergroup ethnocentrism, intergroup threats (realistic, symbolic, and ownership), colorblindness, and intergroup bias (antisemitism and islamophobia) nodes.

### **Discussion**

The results supported the idea that intragroup ethnocentrism corresponds to RWA, while intergroup ethnocentrism corresponds to SDO, an influential role in colorblindness, which likely is related to egalitarianism between ethnic groups in Russia (Grigoryev et al., 2018a). Previous studies also reported low or non-significant relationships of SDO and intercultural attitudes in Russia (see Grigoryev et al., 2020; Grigoryev & van de Vijver, 2018), whereas for Western countries SDO was considered as one of the general social-psychological determinants of intergroup attitudes (see Guimond et al., 2013). This means the universal pattern of the relations between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism but the specific pattern for Russia in regard to SDO.

### **General Discussion**

This paper presents an exploration of authoritarian attitudes in the modern Russian context. The research has attempted to fill the gap of understanding authoritarian attitudes in Russia by looking at key variables that have been discussed in the literature for years.

Further, we make a generalization of our findings and provide their implications for literature in general.

### **RWA in Russia**

In general, RWA shows a similar pattern of relationships to Western studies. They both feature personological and ideological profiles of social conservatives, but not of economic conservatives. Much research in other parts of the world suggests that RWA is the response to external threats; and in the current study, it looks like people predisposed towards “the usual way” have a clear and unambiguous image of the world, increase cohesion and loyalty to the ingroup, hold on to the current order and justify it due to the need to cope with the loss of control, certainty and security feelings. Studies 4 and 5 showed the RWA-C node as central in the networks. Although the subordination of the individual to collective authority has always been considered to be a core aspect of authoritarianism (Duckitt et al., 2010), the special role of authoritarian submission in the authoritarian attitudes of Russians might be referred paternalism, which has deep cultural roots in Russia (Yudina, 2017).

The results of Study 4 support earlier findings that RWA was negatively associated with support of economic, political, and intellectual freedoms and of democratic parties and organizations in Russia (McFarland et al., 1996). On the one hand, traditionalism among Russian authoritarians in the social sphere is represented by Orthodox Christian values (e.g., more religious life, the importance of a large family, the fight against abortion, a strong state, patriotism, etc.), on the other hand, traditionalism in the economic sphere is influenced by Soviet legacy (e.g., anti-capitalism and free market, government regulation, rights working class, etc.). Soviet ideology assigned a special role to the working class. Representative samples in 29 European countries from The European Values Study showed that in almost all countries, working-class individuals were significantly more authoritarian than other

individuals. This relationship between class and authoritarianism was mediated by education, income, media use, and psychological insecurity (de Regt et al., 2012).

### **SDO in Russia**

The peculiarities of SDO in Russia can be explained by rather complex Russian hierarchical relations, especially for the social egalitarianism issue. For example, on the one hand, most Russians are in favor of reducing the gap between the poor and the rich. On the other hand, most Russians strongly deny any equal rights for sexual minorities (Gulevich et al., 2018). Also, half of the ethnic Russians support the position that Russia is a multinational state of all living ethnic groups, as opposed to the other half, who thinks that the ethnic Russians should have some privileges (Grigoryev et al., 2018a).

In general, SDO in the networks usually stands out as a separate cluster and shows a small number of connections with other variables: universalism, fairness, competitive worldview, anti-utopianism, socialism, feminism, egalitarian and working-class rules, welfare benefits, colorblindness, and psychopathy. It is very similar to the content of *social cynicism*, which is one social axiom to detection of deception, is a negative view on human nature, a biased evaluation of some groups of people, and a belief that people disregard ethical means in achieving their ends (Leung & Bond, 2008). It seems that this applies to the part of the Soviet ideology that formally proclaimed all groups to be equal and supported internationalism.

### **Political Views in Russia**

Thus, we can note the peculiarities of considering the differences between conservative (right) and liberal (left) political views for Russia. In Russia, social differences in the views of those who can be called adherents of conservatism and liberalism are also quite similar to those found in the West (e.g., Conway et al., 2021; Duriez et al., 2005; Hadarics, 2017). However, in the economic sphere, there is some inversion: when views

more characteristic of adherents of conservatism in the West are more common among those who can be called adherents of liberalism in Russia, and views more characteristic of the left in the West are more common among those who can be called adherents of liberalism in the West – conservatism in Russia. Apparently, for “conservatives” in Russia, economic views were inherited from Soviet ideology, while today's traditionalism (primarily religious) offers a clear position only on the social agenda. In addition, the population in Russia associates liberalism primarily with economic market reforms in the 90s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today the common people call liberals those who support capitalism and 'Western' (emancipative) values.

### **Implications and Future Research**

A core debate in authoritarianism research relates to the stability of authoritarianism and whether it is impacted by time-sensitive, exterior conditions (Schnelle et al., 2021). We have found a common personological profile of Russian and Western authoritarians that supports the idea of some basic psychological authoritarian syndrome. Indeed, authoritarianism has been tied to specific biological mechanisms; research suggests that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is critical for resistance to authoritarian persuasion (Asp et al., 2012). Further, individual differences in RWA are importantly influenced by genetic contributions including genotype–environment correlation, whereas variance in SDO is largely attributable to environmental sources (Kandler et al., 2016). The ideological attitudes may be reflective of low-level perceptual and cognitive functions, which yields people's cognitive decision-making strategies (Zmigrod et al., 2021).

Early research considers RWA and SDO as personality traits, but more recent research suggests that these constructs are socio-political or, in a different way, ideological attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). According to Pettigrew (2016), however, because situational and social factors influence authoritarianism that does not mean RWA and SDO

cannot be considered as a personality trait since other personality traits are also subject to social influence. These positions are not mutually exclusive. Thus, authoritarianism may initially represent a certain personality trait (integrating into itself: uncertainty, conformity and submission, orientation to strength, closeness and resistance to new experience), which subsequently, as a rule, leads to the corresponding political attitudes (Pettigrew, 2016).

Threat perspective within contextual antecedents suggests a fresh view of authoritarianism (Schnelle et al., 2021). Adding to this debate, we claim that since people live in a social world, their socio-cognitive framework (i.e., perception and interpretation of social ecology) can be the driving force behind motivational goals, expressed and supported through certain ideologies, beliefs, attitudes, etc., which are institutionally and culturally supported. An extended explanation and classification of the purpose of coalitional accommodations were proposed, in the format of three basic sociofunctional motives (defensive, exploitative, and emancipative; Grigoryev et al., 2020; also see Conway et al., 2017, 2020a, 2020c - Study 3-6; Fog, 2019a, 2019b; Gelfand, 2021; Sinn & Hayes, 2017, 2018). Functional motives are a level of individual adaptations, whereas socio-functional motives are a level of coalitional accommodations. In modern conditions, coalitional accommodations are ideologies or sets of social beliefs and attitudes, which like it are “wrap” three basic sociofunctional motives by specific content. However, despite all the diversity, their general orientation boils down to three key factors: (1) protective sociofunctional motive is a response to natural and anthropogenic (including tangible and symbolic) threats; (2) exploitative sociofunctional motive is a response to competition and deprivation, distribution resources, prestige, and power, as well as maintaining the status quo, often through exploitation (i.e., focusing only on one's own interests and completely ignoring the interests of other groups); and finally (3) emancipative socio-functional motive manifests itself when the first two are weakened (and itself weakens them later), as a rule, in a favorable natural and resource environment and

reorients people from solving issues of survival to issues of ensuring freedom, universalism and self-expression, unselfish (civic) individualism and concern for the common good in a broad sense. The emancipative sociofunctional motive is closely related to the so-called thesis of the utility ladder of freedoms (for more details see Welzel, 2013). Sinn and Hayes (2017, 2018) demonstrated a parallel between authoritarian and dominating functional motives and in this view proximate psychological concepts as RWA and SDO, respectively.

Thus, considering a common pattern of reaction to threat among Russian and Western authoritarians, RWA reflects a special socio-functional response to an external threat: a strategy of rallying around a strong leader, maintaining ingroup solidarity (more often in a conventional way through traditional social norms, which highly dependent on specific contexts), and protecting the order through harsh punishment of dissents. Hence, authoritarianism is based on the psychology of group tribalism (Conway et al., 2020b; Fog, 2019a). In turn, SDO is associated with a socio-functional response to competitive threats of change to the social hierarchy, power, and achievement, which likely suggests more varied and flexible strategies. This view supports mentioned above the proportion of genotype–environment correlation found by Kandler et al. (2016) for RWA and SDO.

It seems that the features of threat response are pancultural, i.e. they are typical both for Russia and for other contexts (Gelfand, 2021; see also Butler, 2013; Russo et al., 2020). Whereas culturally specific elements refer to the distribution of these features along the ideological spectrum of conservative and liberal political views, which are historically shaped in a special way in specific country conditions. In the present study, we observed both similarities and differences between Russian authoritarianism and other places that maps onto this framework. However, it is worth noting that our work focused on measurements of RWA and their associations with politically neutral, politically conservative, and politically liberal traits and values. As noted by Conway et al. (2021), there is a difference between (1) a person

high in RWA endorsing liberal positions such as anticapitalism, and (2) a person endorsing strong LWA *on those liberal positions*. Thus, the current studies provide important context to prior discussions of LWA and create a foundation for further exploring authoritarianism in Russia using LWA. In its not too-distant-past, modern Russia was run by an inherently left-wing, communist political system, largely rooted in authoritarian ties. Indeed, understanding the impact of this political history is valuable, and in conjunction with the results of the current studies, directly measuring LWA in the future will also provide further insight into understanding the complexities of authoritarianism in a modern, post-communist Russia.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>However, considering RWA and SDO together in form of generalized authoritarianism can be also useful (see Hodson et al., 2017).

<sup>2</sup>These differences in power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence can be tracked on the Hofstede Insights' website, <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/russia,the-usa/> (October 15, 2018).

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Table 1.

*The Sociodemographic Information on All the Studies (N = 1358)*

|         | <i>N</i> | % men | <i>M</i> <sub>age</sub> ( <i>SD</i> ), range | % had a university education | % were Russian Orthodox Christians | % were students |
|---------|----------|-------|--|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Study 1 | 244      | 68.9  | 30.5 (12.8), 16-82                           | 42.6                         | 25.8                               | 27.0            |
| Study 2 | 205      | 69.3  | 29.4 (11.1), 16-71                           | 43.5                         | 19.5                               | 28.3            |
| Study 3 | 228      | 69.3  | 30.6 (11.7), 16-67                           | 47.2                         | 31.1                               | 20.2            |
| Study 4 | 224      | 65.2  | 28.8 (11.9), 16-67                           | 39.3                         | 29.9                               | 40.2            |
| Study 5 | 232      | 52.2  | 28.5 (10.2), 16-61                           | 51.4                         | 31.9                               | 36.2            |
| Study 6 | 225      | 58.2  | 31.2 (12.7), 16-82                           | 57.8                         | 40.0                               | 28.0            |

Table 2.

*Bivariate Correlations between RWA, SDO, and Other Focal Variables for Study 1 (N = 244)*

|                      | RWA     |               |                |         |        |                | SDO           |               |
|----------------------|---------|---------------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
|                      | RWA:ACT |               |                | RWA:ASC |        |                | D             | E             |
|                      | A       | C             | T              | A       | S      | C              |               |               |
| Level of religiosity | .39***  | .57***        | <b>.59***</b>  | .30***  | .38*** | .53***         | .17**         | .04           |
| Big Five             |         |               |                |         |        |                |               |               |
| Extraversion         | .13*    | .14*          | <b>.16*</b>    | .04     | .05    | .08            | .04           | .04           |
| Agreeableness        | -.05    | .02           | .14*           | -.11†   | -.01   | .16*           | <b>-.21**</b> | -.19**        |
| Conscientiousness    | .17*    | .20**         | <b>.24***</b>  | .13*    | .11†   | .26***         | .08           | .08           |
| Neuroticism          | -.08    | -.11†         | <b>-.23***</b> | -.09    | .01    | -.17**         | -.01          | -.04          |
| Imagination          | -.12†   | -.04          | -.12†          | -.09    | -.02   | -.09           | -.02          | .02           |
| Dark Triad           |         |               |                |         |        |                |               |               |
| Narcissism           | -.08    | -.10†         | <b>-.20**</b>  | -.06    | -.03   | -.15*          | .06           | .08           |
| Psychopathy          | -.01    | -.13*         | <b>-.27***</b> | .06     | -.10   | <b>-.26***</b> | <b>.25***</b> | <b>.30***</b> |
| Machiavellianism     | .04     | -.03          | -.16*          | .09     | -.01   | -.10           | .21**         | .14*          |
| Need for closure     | .29***  | <b>.30***</b> | <b>.30***</b>  | .22***  | .06    | .24***         | -.01          | -.12†         |

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ , †  $p < .10$ .

The most strong correlations in rows are bold.

Table 3.

*Bivariate Correlations between RWA, SDO, and Other Focal Variables for Study 2 (N = 205)*

|                      | RWA           |                |                |         |         |         | SDO     |                |
|----------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------------|
|                      | RWA:ACT       |                |                | RWA:ASC |         |         | D       | E              |
|                      | A             | C              | T              | A       | S       | C       |         |                |
| Level of religiosity | .27***        | .34***         | <b>.49***</b>  | .25***  | .21**   | .43***  | .15*    | .10            |
| Basic human values   |               |                |                |         |         |         |         |                |
| Self-Direction       | -.26***       | -.28***        | <b>-.39***</b> | -.19**  | -.28*** | -.28*** | -.03    | -.03           |
| Stimulation          | -.18**        | -.23**         | <b>-.33***</b> | -.21**  | -.21**  | -.20**  | -.09    | -.07           |
| Hedonism             | -.27***       | -.39***        | <b>-.43***</b> | -.22**  | -.24*** | -.29*** | -.13†   | -.09           |
| Achievement          | -.20**        | <b>-.31***</b> | <b>-.31***</b> | -.17*   | -.23**  | -.17**  | .06     | .02            |
| Power                | -.12†         | -.20**         | <b>-.23**</b>  | -.15*   | -.28*** | -.12†   | .12†    | .08            |
| Security             | <b>.31***</b> | .15*           | .25***         | .17*    | .07     | .32***  | -.01    | -.10           |
| Tradition            | .36***        | .46***         | <b>.53***</b>  | .31***  | .30***  | .48***  | .07     | .08            |
| Conformity           | <b>.43***</b> | .41***         | .40***         | .33***  | .27***  | .36***  | .14*    | .09            |
| Benevolence          | .09           | .11            | .15*           | .01     | .11     | .22**   | -.05    | -.09           |
| Universalism         | -.25***       | -.32***        | -.26***        | -.37*** | -.21**  | -.07    | -.35*** | <b>-.41***</b> |

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ , †  $p < .10$ .

The most strong correlations in rows are bold.

Table 4.

*Bivariate Correlations between RWA, SDO, and Other Focal Variables for Study 3 (N = 228)*

|                              | RWA          |                |               |         |         |         | SDO           |               |
|------------------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|---------------|
|                              | RWA:ACT      |                |               | RWA:ASC |         |         | D             | E             |
|                              | A            | C              | T             | A       | S       | C       |               |               |
| Social worldviews            |              |                |               |         |         |         |               |               |
| Dangerous worldview          | .35***       | .19**          | <b>.39***</b> | .25***  | -.10    | .33***  | -.03          | -.12†         |
| Competitive worldview        | .09          | -.14*          | -.19**        | .12†    | -.20**  | -.23*** | <b>.30***</b> | .17**         |
| Global Belief in Just World  | .13†         | <b>.31***</b>  | .16*          | .12†    | .36***  | .17*    | .17**         | .20**         |
| Zero-Sum Game Belief         | <b>.18**</b> | -.08           | -.01          | .10     | -.28*** | -.05    | .03           | -.02          |
| Utopian Thinking             |              |                |               |         |         |         |               |               |
| Utopianism                   | -.03         | <b>-.21**</b>  | -.13*         | -.12†   | -.15*   | -.15*   | -.12†         | -.13†         |
| Anti-Utopianism              | .17**        | -.23**         | .12†          | .19**   | .13*    | .22**   | .19**         | <b>.26***</b> |
| Escapism                     | -.06         | -.16*          | <b>-.20**</b> | -.08    | -.10    | -.15*   | -.01          | -.05          |
| Generic Conspiracist Beliefs |              |                |               |         |         |         |               |               |
| Government malfeasance       | -.30***      | <b>-.50***</b> | -.26***       | -.29*** | -.53*** | -.26*** | -.12†         | -.10          |
| Malevolent global conspiracy | .34***       | .30***         | <b>.37***</b> | .18**   | .03     | .34***  | -.06          | -.01          |
| Extraterrestrial cover-up    | .25***       | .24***         | <b>.30***</b> | .18**   | .06     | .27***  | .02           | .07           |
| Personal wellbeing           | .35***       | .32***         | <b>.42***</b> | .25***  | .07     | .39***  | .01           | -.04          |
| Control of information       | .13†         | .06            | <b>.16*</b>   | .08     | -.09    | .11†    | .01           | .01           |
| Paranormal Beliefs           | .44***       | .46***         | <b>.52***</b> | .38***  | .31***  | .51***  | .01           | .06           |

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ , †  $p < .10$ .

The most strong correlations in rows are bold.

Table 5.

*Bivariate Correlations between RWA, SDO, and Other Focal Variables for Study 4 (N = 224)*

|  | RWA         |               |               |         |         |        | SDO     |                |
|--|-------------|---------------|---------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|----------------|
|  | RWA:ACT     |               |               | RWA:ASC |         |        | D       | E              |
|  | A           | C             | T             | A       | S       | C      |         |                |
| <b>Moral foundations</b>               |             |               |               |         |         |        |         |                |
| Care/Harm                              | .01         | .12†          | .26***        | -.12†   | -.05    | .30*** | -.31*** | <b>-.33***</b> |
| Fairness/Cheating                      | -.07        | -.18**        | .03           | -.13†   | -.36*** | .05    | -.37*** | <b>-.39***</b> |
| Loyalty/Betrayal                       | .45***      | .54***        | <b>.62***</b> | .42***  | .27***  | .64*** | -.01    | -.07           |
| Authority/<br>Subversion               | .58***      | <b>.72***</b> | .71***        | .58***  | .42***  | .70*** | .09     | .05            |
| Sanctity/<br>Degradation               | .37***      | .43***        | <b>.66***</b> | .32***  | .15*    | .62*** | -.15*   | -.14*          |
| <b>Ambivalent sexism<br/>inventory</b> |             |               |               |         |         |        |         |                |
| Hostile sexism                         | <b>.15*</b> | -.02          | .07           | .07     | -.04    | .01    | .13†    | .14*           |
| Benevolent sexism                      | .46***      | .42***        | <b>.56***</b> | .28***  | .18**   | .47*** | -.02    | -.02           |
| Personal community<br>collectivism     | .42***      | .45***        | <b>.55***</b> | .32***  | .30***  | .51*** | -.01    | -.11†          |
| <b>Material values</b>                 |             |               |               |         |         |        |         |                |
| Happiness                              | -.08        | <b>-.22**</b> | -.12†         | -.15*   | -.20**  | -.07   | -.01    | .01            |
| Success                                | -.06        | .04           | .01           | -.03    | .02     | .07    | .20**   | <b>.22**</b>   |
| Centrality                             | -.05        | .03           | -.07          | -.10    | .06     | .02    | .10     | .10            |

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ , †  $p < .10$ .

The most strong correlations in rows are bold.

Table 6.

*Bivariate Correlations between RWA, SDO, and Other Focal Variables for Study 4 (N = 224)*

|                                | RWA            |                |                |         |         |         | SDO          |                |
|--------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|--------------|----------------|
|                                | RWA:ACT        |                |                | RWA:ASC |         |         | D            | E              |
|                                | A              | C              | T              | A       | S       | C       |              |                |
| <b>Social conservatism</b>     |                |                |                |         |         |         |              |                |
| Religion                       | .28***         | .46***         | <b>.51***</b>  | .31***  | .32***  | .59***  | .03          | -.01           |
| Atheism                        | -.31***        | -.46***        | <b>-.56***</b> | -.27*** | -.28*** | -.61*** | -.02         | .01            |
| Traditional values             | .56***         | .57***         | <b>.77***</b>  | .46***  | .36***  | .75***  | .04          | -.02           |
| Same-sex marriage              | -.49***        | -.40***        | <b>-.57***</b> | -.34*** | -.17*   | -.52*** | -.04         | -.11†          |
| Childless family               | -.32***        | -.39***        | <b>-.53***</b> | -.27*** | -.21**  | -.45*** | -.04         | -.09           |
| Abortions                      | -.45***        | -.41***        | <b>-.58***</b> | -.33*** | -.23**  | -.52*** | -.04         | -.07           |
| Sexuality education            | -.40***        | -.46***        | <b>-.50***</b> | -.40*** | -.24*** | -.42*** | -.15*        | -.10           |
| Large family                   | .31***         | .31***         | <b>.45***</b>  | .20**   | .13†    | .44***  | -.07         | -.03           |
| Euthanasia                     | -.25***        | -.31***        | <b>-.52***</b> | -.21**  | -.19**  | -.42*** | -.01         | .02            |
| The death penalty              | <b>.46***</b>  | .26***         | .26***         | .36***  | .09     | .24***  | .06          | .06            |
| Patriotism                     | .52***         | .54***         | <b>.65***</b>  | .45***  | .34***  | .68***  | -.10         | -.06           |
| Military and national security | .56***         | .55***         | <b>.58***</b>  | .53***  | .34***  | .58***  | -.01         | -.03           |
| Strict laws                    | <b>.52***</b>  | .43***         | .38***         | .39***  | .25***  | .32***  | -.07         | -.08           |
| Freedom of speech              | -.39***        | <b>-.43***</b> | -.34***        | -.40*** | -.35*** | -.23**  | -.13†        | -.01           |
| <b>Economic conservatism</b>   |                |                |                |         |         |         |              |                |
| Business                       | -.17*          | -.13†          | -.07           | -.08    | -.12†   | -.03    | .11†         | .16*           |
| Capitalism and free market     | <b>-.43***</b> | -.33***        | -.38***        | -.28*** | -.11    | -.32*** | .14*         | .19**          |
| Fiscal responsibility          | .05            | .14*           | .03            | .12†    | .12†    | .08     | -.01         | .01            |
| Personal responsibility        | -.05           | -.11           | -.03           | -.12†   | -.17*   | .04     | -.11         | -.01           |
| Welfare benefits               | .17*           | .05            | .15*           | .10     | .01     | .17*    | -.21**       | <b>-.29***</b> |
| Emigration from the country    | -.37***        | -.41***        | <b>-.43***</b> | -.33*** | -.29*** | -.36*** | -.06         | -.02           |
| Immigration to the country     | -.29***        | -.19**         | <b>-.34***</b> | -.22**  | -.12†   | -.21**  | -.15*        | -.02           |
| Animal rights                  | -.11†          | -.21**         | -.05           | -.16*   | -.18**  | -.03    | -.18**       | <b>-.22**</b>  |
| Climate change                 | -.01           | .02            | -.01           | -.04    | -.01    | -.04    | <b>-.16*</b> | -.13†          |

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ , †  $p < .10$ .

The most strong correlations in rows are bold.

Table 7.

*Bivariate Correlations between RWA, SDO, and Other Focal Variables for Study 5 (N = 232)*

|   | RWA     |                |               |         |         |        | SDO     |                |
|---|---------|----------------|---------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|----------------|
|   | RWA:ACT |                |               | RWA:ASC |         |        | D       | E              |
|   | A       | C              | T             | A       | S       | C      |         |                |
| National proud                          |         |                |               |         |         |        |         |                |
| Collective narcissism                   | .41***  | .48***         | <b>.51***</b> | .36***  | .41***  | .49*** | .20**   | .19**          |
| Patriotism                              | .43***  | <b>.60***</b>  | .48***        | .44***  | .56***  | .50*** | .20**   | .22**          |
| Nationalism                             | .46***  | <b>.60***</b>  | <b>.60***</b> | .46***  | .45***  | .52*** | .23***  | .23***         |
| Intergroup threats                      |         |                |               |         |         |        |         |                |
| Symbolic threat                         | .51***  | .57***         | <b>.64***</b> | .42***  | .40***  | .40*** | .10     | .10            |
| Realistic threat                        | .03     | -.11†          | -.05          | -.03    | -.12†   | -.06   | .06     | .03            |
| National threat perception              |         |                |               |         |         |        |         |                |
| National siege mentality                | .41***  | <b>.45***</b>  | <b>.45***</b> | .39***  | .40***  | .43*** | .11     | .10            |
| Anti-western orientation                | .49***  | .56***         | <b>.62***</b> | .34***  | .35***  | .37*** | .11†    | .10            |
| Totalitarian socialist ideology         |         |                |               |         |         |        |         |                |
| State economic interventionism          | .54***  | <b>.55***</b>  | .47***        | .54***  | .43***  | .30*** | .15*    | .07            |
| Egalitarianism and working-class ruling | .11†    | .06            | .20**         | .05     | -.03    | -.04   | -.36*** | <b>-.39***</b> |
| Political totalitarianism               | .47***  | <b>.63***</b>  | .53***        | .54***  | .55***  | .44*** | .27***  | .27***         |
| General system justification            | .44***  | <b>.72***</b>  | .49***        | .51***  | .71***  | .50*** | .30***  | .30***         |
| Activism intention                      | -.25*** | <b>-.37***</b> | -.14*         | -.26*** | -.32*** | -.11   | -.29*** | -.25***        |
| Watching TV                             | .37***  | <b>.46***</b>  | .43***        | .26***  | .36***  | .33*** | .12†    | .16*           |

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ , †  $< .10$ .

The most strong correlations in rows are bold.

Table 8.

*Bivariate Correlations between RWA, SDO, and Other Focal Variables for Study 6 (N = 225)*

|                           | RWA     |        |               |         |        |        | SDO            |         |
|---------------------------|---------|--------|---------------|---------|--------|--------|----------------|---------|
|                           | RWA:ACT |        |               | RWA:ASC |        |        | D              | E       |
|                           | A       | C      | T             | A       | S      | C      |                |         |
| <b>Ethnocentrism</b>      |         |        |               |         |        |        |                |         |
| Intergroup ethnocentrism  | .25***  | .16*   | .28***        | .22**   | .02    | .27*** | <b>.36***</b>  | .30***  |
| Intragroup ethnocentrism  | .56***  | .57*** | <b>.68***</b> | .49***  | .39*** | .70*** | .26***         | .17*    |
| <b>Intergroup threats</b> |         |        |               |         |        |        |                |         |
| Realistic threat          | .11     | -.01   | <b>.22**</b>  | .11     | -.05   | .17**  | .17*           | .09     |
| Symbolic threat           | .23**   | .06    | .25***        | .20**   | .03    | .22**  | <b>.30***</b>  | .19**   |
| Ownership threat          | .17*    | -.01   | .15*          | .15*    | -.05   | .13*   | <b>.18**</b>   | .13†    |
| Colorblindness            | -.28*** | -.12†  | -.28***       | -.29*** | .01    | -.22** | <b>-.41***</b> | -.40*** |
| Ethnic identification     | .41***  | .44*** | <b>.54***</b> | .35***  | .32*** | .59*** | .04            | -.04    |
| <b>Intergroup bias</b>    |         |        |               |         |        |        |                |         |
| Antisemitism              | .26***  | .14*   | <b>.36***</b> | .19*    | .01    | .32*** | .23**          | .15*    |
| Islamophobia              | -.02    | -.12†  | .01           | -.02    | -.16*  | -.06   | <b>.19**</b>   | .10     |

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ , †  $< .10$ .

The most strong correlations in rows are bold.



Figure 2. Network Plot for Study 2 (N = 205)




Figure 3. Network Plot for Study 3 (N = 228)




Figure 4. Network Plot for Study 4 (N = 224)






Figure 6. Network Plot for Study 5 (N = 232)





Figure 7. Network Plot for Study 6 (N = 225)



## Supplementary Material

**Authoritarian Attitudes in Russia: Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation in the Modern Russian Context**

This Supplementary Material contains the Method sections by the studies. Centrality plots for the networks are placed below.

**Study 1****Participants**

The total sample of 244 participants included 31.1% women and 68.9% men, their age ranged from 16 to 82 ( $M = 30.5$ ,  $SD = 12.8$ ); 42.6% had a university education, 25.8% were Russian Orthodox Christians, and 27.0% were current students.

**Measures**

**RWA.** We used two versions of the measure RWA: a short version of the RWA:Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism (RWA:ACT; Duckitt et al., 2010) and RWA:Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism (RWA:ASC; Dunwoody & Funke, 2016). Eighteen items from the RWA:ACT assessed RWA: authoritarianism ( $\alpha = .84$ ), conservatism ( $\alpha = .85$ ), and traditionalism ( $\alpha = .89$ ). Eighteen items from the RWA:ASC assessed RWA: aggression ( $\alpha = .72$ ), submission ( $\alpha = .74$ ), and conventionalism ( $\alpha = .80$ ). Both of them had a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*). RWA:ACT was the main measure of RWA in the research project.

**SDO.** Sixteen items of the SDO<sub>7</sub> (Ho et al., 2012) scale with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the SDO: SDO-Dominance (SDO-D;  $\alpha$

= .75) and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E;  $\alpha = .83$ ). The bivariate correlations between RWA and SDO measures across the studies are available in STable 1.

Supplementary Table 1.

*Bivariate Correlations between RWA and SDO Measures across the Studies (N = 1358)*

|              | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5      | 6      | 7      |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| RWA:ACT      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 1. RWA:ACT-A | -      |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 2. RWA:ACT-C | .67*** | -      |        |        |        |        |        |
| 3. RWA:ACT-T | .63*** | .67*** | -      |        |        |        |        |
| RWA:ASC      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 4. RWA:ASC-A | .70*** | .67*** | .50*** | -      |        |        |        |
| 5. RWA:ASC-S | .44*** | .70*** | .41*** | .53*** | -      |        |        |
| 6. RWA:ASC-C | .54*** | .59*** | .73*** | .45*** | .38*** | -      |        |
| SDO          |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 7. SDO-D     | .20*** | .21*** | .09**  | .28*** | .21*** | .12*** | -      |
| 8. SDO-E     | .14*** | .18*** | .06*   | .21*** | .17*** | .09**  | .75*** |

Note. \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ .

**Level of Religiosity.** We used one item with an 11-point Likert scale from the European Social Survey to assess the level of religiosity (ESS, 2016).

**Big Five.** Twenty items from the IPIP-20-Item Mini-IPIP questionnaire (Donnellan et al., 2006) with a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *very inaccurate*, 5 = *very accurate*) assessed the Big Five personality traits: extraversion ( $\alpha = .80$ ), agreeableness ( $\alpha = .64$ ), conscientiousness ( $\alpha = .66$ ), neuroticism ( $\alpha = .76$ ), and imagination ( $\alpha = .64$ ). The Russian translation of the measure is based on version of the 50-item lexical Big Five factor markers provided by Olga Hypponen.<sup>1</sup>

**Dark Triad.** Twelve items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the Dark Triad personality traits (Jonason & Webster, 2010): narcissism ( $\alpha = .77$ ), psychopathy ( $\alpha = .74$ ), and machiavellianism ( $\alpha = .82$ ). We used the Russian translation of this measure by Kornilova et al. (2015).

<sup>1</sup> The translation was retrieved from the International Personality Item Pool, <https://ipip.ori.org/Russian50-itemBigFiveFactorMarkers.htm> (October 15, 2018).

**Need for Closure.** Fifteen items from a brief version of the Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the Need for Closure personality traits ( $\alpha = .80$ ): order, predictability, decisiveness, ambiguity, and closed-mindedness.

## Study 2

### Participants

The total sample of 205 participants included 30.7% women and 69.3% men, their age ranged from 16 to 71 ( $M = 29.4$ ,  $SD = 11.1$ ); 43.5% had a university education, 19.5% were Russian Orthodox Christians, and 28.3% were current students.

### Measures

We used the same measures for RWA (RWA:ACT: authoritarianism [ $\alpha = .86$ ], conservatism [ $\alpha = .86$ ], and traditionalism [ $\alpha = .89$ ]; RWA:ASC: aggression [ $\alpha = .77$ ], submission [ $\alpha = .81$ ], and conventionalism [ $\alpha = .83$ ]), SDO (SDO-Dominance [ $\alpha = .75$ ] and SDO-Egalitarianism [ $\alpha = .86$ ]), and level of religiosity as in Study 1.

**Basic Human Values.** Twenty-one items with a 6-point Likert scale (1 = *not like me at all*, 6 = *very much like me*) assessed the ten basic human values by Schwartz (2003): self-direction ( $\alpha = .60$ ), stimulation ( $\alpha = .76$ ), hedonism ( $\alpha = .82$ ), achievement ( $\alpha = .80$ ), power ( $\alpha = .61$ ), security ( $\alpha = .51$ ), tradition ( $\alpha = .10$ )<sup>2</sup>, conformity ( $\alpha = .56$ ), benevolence ( $\alpha = .56$ ), and universalism ( $\alpha = .55$ ; ESS, 2016).

## Study 3

### Participants

The total sample of 228 participants included 30.7% women and 69.3% men, their age ranged from 16 to 67 ( $M = 30.6$ ,  $SD = 11.7$ ); 47.2% had a university education, 31.1% were Russian Orthodox Christians, and 20.2% were current students.

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2 Due to unsatisfactory internal consistency, only one item was used, which in its meaning was closest to the expression of the tradition values.

## Measures

We used the same measures for RWA (RWA:ACT: authoritarianism [ $\alpha = .84$ ], conservatism [ $\alpha = .84$ ], and traditionalism [ $\alpha = .87$ ]; RWA:ASC: aggression [ $\alpha = .74$ ], submission [ $\alpha = .74$ ], and conventionalism [ $\alpha = .86$ ]), and SDO (SDO-Dominance [ $\alpha = .76$ ] and SDO-Egalitarianism [ $\alpha = .83$ ]) as in Study 1.

**Dangerous and Competitive Worldviews.** Twenty items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed social worldviews (Perry et al., 2013): dangerous worldview ( $\alpha = .81$ ) and competitive worldview ( $\alpha = .75$ ). Sample items included: “There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all”, “It’s a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times”.

**Global Belief in a Just World.** Seven items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the global belief in a just world ( $\alpha = .87$ ; Lipkus, 1991). Sample items included: “I feel that people get what they are entitled to have”, “I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves”.

**Zero-Sum Game Belief.** Twelve items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the zero-sum game belief ( $\alpha = .83$ ; Różycka-Tran et al., 2015). Sample items included: “Successes of some people are usually failures of others”, “Life is so devised that when somebody gains, others have to lose”.

**Utopianism and Anti-Utopianism.** Eight items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed utopianism ( $\alpha = .87$ ) and anti-utopianism ( $\alpha = .66$ ; Fernando et al., 2018). Sample items included: “I often think about what an ideal society might look like”, “It is useless to dream about what an ideal society might look like”.

**Escapism.** Five items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all appealing*, 7 = *very appealing*) assessed escapism ( $\alpha = .81$ ; Fernando et al., 2018). Sample items included:

“Having fantasies about what an imagined world might be like”, “Daydreaming or imagining a better time or place than the one you are in”.

**Generic Conspiracist Beliefs.** Fifteen items with a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *definitely not true*, 5 = *definitely true*) assessed generic conspiracist beliefs (Brotherton et al., 2013): government malfeasance ( $\alpha = .83$ ), malevolent global conspiracy ( $\alpha = .88$ ), extraterrestrial cover-up ( $\alpha = .82$ ), personal wellbeing ( $\alpha = .81$ ), and control of information ( $\alpha = .52$ ). Sample items included: “A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as going to war”, “Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent”.

**Paranormal Beliefs.** Twenty-six items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed paranormal beliefs ( $\alpha = .96$ ; Tobacyk, 2004): traditional religious belief, psi, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms, precognition. Sample items included: “Witches do exist”, “Some psychics can accurately predict the future”. We used the Russian translation of this measure by Grigoryev (2015).

## Study 4

### Participants

The total sample of 224 participants included 34.8% women and 65.2% men, their age ranged from 16 to 67 ( $M = 28.8$ ,  $SD = 11.9$ ); 39.3% had a university education, 29.9% were Russian Orthodox Christians, and 40.2% were current students.

### Measures

We used the same measures for RWA (RWA:ACT: authoritarianism [ $\alpha = .83$ ], conservatism [ $\alpha = .86$ ], and traditionalism [ $\alpha = .86$ ]; RWA:ASC: aggression [ $\alpha = .77$ ], submission [ $\alpha = .74$ ], and conventionalism [ $\alpha = .84$ ]), and SDO (SDO-Dominance [ $\alpha = .71$ ] and SDO-Egalitarianism [ $\alpha = .87$ ]) as in Study 1.

**Moral Foundations.** Thirty items with a 6-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all relevant/absolutely disagree*, 6 = *very relevant/absolutely agree*) assessed the moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011): care/harm ( $\alpha = .66$ ), fairness/cheating ( $\alpha = .67$ ), loyalty/betrayal ( $\alpha = .66$ ), authority/subversion ( $\alpha = .70$ ), and sanctity/degradation (purity) ( $\alpha = .79$ ).

**Ambivalent Sexism Inventory.** Twenty two items with a 6-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 6 = *absolutely agree*) assessed hostile sexism ( $\alpha = .83$ ) and benevolent sexism ( $\alpha = .84$ ; Glick & Fiske, 1996).

**Personal Community Collectivism.** Fifteen items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the personal community collectivism ( $\alpha = .79$ ; Akkuş et al., 2017): honor, agency, loyalty, and hierarchy. Sample items included: “I feel responsible for preserving and protecting my family member’s honor”, “I will do what I can when a family member needs me”.

**Material Values.** Nine items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed material values (Richins, 2004): happiness ( $\alpha = .73$ ), success ( $\alpha = .53$ ), and centrality ( $\alpha = .59$ ). Sample items included: “I’d be happier if I could afford to buy more things”, “Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure”.

**Social and Economic Conservatism.** From Everett (2013), participants received a set of domains which relevant to conservative agenda in Russia (e.g., traditional values, military and national security, fiscal responsibility, etc.) and then asks them to rate “How positive or negative do you feel about each issue on the scale of 0 to 100, where 0 represents very negative, and 100 represents very positive?”.

## Study 5

### Participants

The total sample of 232 participants included 47.8% women and 52.2% men, their age ranged from 16 to 61 ( $M = 28.5$ ,  $SD = 10.2$ ); 51.4% had a university education, 31.9% were Russian Orthodox Christians, and 36.2% were current students.

### Measures

We used the same measures for RWA (RWA:ACT: authoritarianism [ $\alpha = .80$ ], conservatism [ $\alpha = .86$ ], and traditionalism [ $\alpha = .86$ ]; RWA:ASC: aggression [ $\alpha = .74$ ], submission [ $\alpha = .80$ ], and conventionalism [ $\alpha = .87$ ]), and SDO (SDO-Dominance [ $\alpha = .77$ ] and SDO-Egalitarianism [ $\alpha = .87$ ]) as in Study 1.

**Collective Narcissism.** Nine items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed collective narcissism ( $\alpha = .93$ ; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009).<sup>3</sup> Sample items included: “My group deserves special treatment”, “I wish other groups would more quickly recognize authority of my group”.

**Patriotism and Nationalism.** Ten items with a 4-point Likert scale (1 = *not proud at all*, 4 = *very proud*) assessed patriotism ( $\alpha = .85$ ) and four with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed nationalism ( $\alpha = .86$ ; Grigoryan & Lepshokova, 2012). Sample items included: “I am proud of the scientific and technical achievements of Russia”, “The world would be much better if people from other countries would be more like Russians”.

**National Threat Perception.** Nine items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the national threat perception (Šram & Dulić, 2015): national siege mentality ( $\alpha = .74$ ) and anti-western orientation ( $\alpha = .88$ ). Sample items included: “The whole world is against us”, “The Western countries will completely ruin our state sovereignty”.

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3 The translation was retrieved from the PrejudiceLab, <http://collectivenarcissism.com/research-materials/> (October 15, 2018).

**Symbolic and Realistic Threat.** Twelve items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed symbolic threat ( $\alpha = .86$ ) and realistic threat ( $\alpha = .83$ ; Mashuri et al., 2016).

**Totalitarian Socialist Ideology.** Twelve items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the totalitarian socialist ideology (Šram & Dulić, 2015): state economic interventionism ( $\alpha = .74$ ), egalitarianism and working-class ruling ( $\alpha = .71$ ), and political totalitarianism ( $\alpha = .77$ ). Sample items included: “Economy can be developed and advanced only if it is lead by the firm hand of the state”, “We need a strong intelligence agency to tap phones, investigate bank accounts and do whatever else is necessary to protect us against state enemies and foreign spies”.

**General (or Diffuse) System Justification.** Eight items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed system justification ( $\alpha = .91$ ; Jost, 2015).

**Activism Intention.** Ten items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the activism intention ( $\alpha = .85$ ; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Sample items included: “ I would volunteer my time working (i.e., write petitions, distribute flyers, recruit people, etc.) for an organization that fights for my group’s political and legal rights”.

**Watching TV.** We asked the participants to indicate how often they watch TV and how often they watch Russian news and political programs using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *never*, 7 = *more than two hours every day*;  $\alpha = .77$ ).

## Study 6

### Participants

The total sample of 225 participants included 41.8% women and 58.2% men, their ages ranged from 16 to 82 ( $M = 31.2$ ,  $SD = 12.7$ ); 57.8% had a university education, 40.0% were Russian Orthodox Christians, and 28.0% were current students.

### Measures

We used the same measures for RWA (RWA:ACT: authoritarianism [ $\alpha = .80$ ], conservatism [ $\alpha = .86$ ], and traditionalism [ $\alpha = .86$ ]; RWA:ASC: aggression [ $\alpha = .77$ ], submission [ $\alpha = .78$ ], and conventionalism [ $\alpha = .87$ ]) and SDO (SDO-Dominance [ $\alpha = .78$ ] and SDO-Egalitarianism [ $\alpha = .87$ ]) as in Study 1.

**Ethnocentrism.** Twelve items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the cultural ethnocentrism (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012): intergroup ethnocentrism (preference, superiority, purity, exploitativeness;  $\alpha = .84$ ) and intragroup ethnocentrism (group cohesion, devotion;  $\alpha = .70$ ). Sample items included: “Our culture would be much better off if we could keep people from different cultures out”, “We should focus all our energy on trying to develop a greater sense of unity, community, and solidarity in our cultural group”.

**Intergroup Threats.** Twelve items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed three intergroup threats (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017): realistic threat ( $\alpha = .89$ ), symbolic threat ( $\alpha = .92$ ), ownership threat ( $\alpha = .89$ ). Sample items included: “Because of the arrival of immigrants, Russian natives less quickly find a job”, “Because many immigrants live here, Russian natives have less and less influence in their own country”.

**Colorblindness.** Five items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed colorblindness ( $\alpha = .89$ ; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). We used the Russian translation of this measure by Grigoryev et al. (2018). Sample items included: “At our core, all human beings are really all the same, so racial and ethnic categories do not

matter”, “Ethnic and cultural group categories are not very important for understanding or making decisions about people”.

**Ethnic Identification.** Five items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed the ethnic identification ( $\alpha = .89$ ; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). We used the Russian translation of this measure by Grigoryev and Berry (2017). Sample items included: “I consider myself as part of my ethnic group”, “I feel part of my heritage culture”.

**Antisemitism.** Five items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed antisemitism ( $\alpha = .91$ ; Padovan & Alietti, 2012). Sample items included: “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust”, “Jews have too much power in the business world and in international financial markets.”.

**Islamophobia.** Sixteen items with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *absolutely disagree*, 7 = *absolutely agree*) assessed both cognitive and affective-behavioral aspects of islamophobia ( $\alpha = .97$ ; Lee et al., 2009). Sample items included: “If possible, I would avoid going to places where Muslims would be”, “I believe that Muslims support the killings of all non-Muslims.”.

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
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
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
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
Supplementary Figure 1. Centrality Plot for Study 1 (N = 244)




Supplementary Figure 2. Centrality Plot for Study 2 (N = 205)




Supplementary Figure 3. Centrality Plot for Study 3 (N = 228)




Supplementary Figure 4. Centrality Plot for Study 4 (N = 224)




Supplementary Figure 5. Centrality Plot for Study 4 (N = 224)




Supplementary Figure 6. Centrality Plot for Study 5 (N = 232)




Supplementary Figure 7. Centrality Plot for Study 6 (N = 225)




Supplementary Figure 8. *Stability of Centrality Measures Plot for Study 1 (N = 244)*




Supplementary Figure 9. *Stability of Centrality Measures Plot for Study 2 (N = 205)*




Supplementary Figure 10. *Stability of Centrality Measures Plot for Study 3 (N = 228)*




Supplementary Figure 11. *Stability of Centrality Measures Plot for Study 4 (N = 224)*



Supplementary Figure 12. *Stability of Centrality Measures Plot for Study 4 (N = 224)*



Supplementary Figure 13. *Stability of Centrality Measures Plot for Study 5 (N = 232)*



Supplementary Figure 14. *Stability of Centrality Measures Plot for Study 6 (N = 225)*